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Abstract
A majority of developed countries have realized the importance of functioning venture capital markets for job creation,
innovation, and economic growth. Accordingly, governments have taken measures to support the development and
efficient functioning of national venture capital markets. As a policy response, particularly in the more problematic
early-stage investment area, many countries have set up government financed support programs to channel risk capital
to new ventures through private VC funds. The choice of the incentive structure for a publicly co-financed and privately
managed venture capital fund is crucial for the success of a program. However, there is very little robust research
determining the actual effects of different structures on fund performance. A comparison of government VC structures
has been hindered by both the variety of utilized structures and the plurality of domestic environments. In this study, we
examine the effects of different incentive structures on the performance of publicly co-financed venture capital programs
under changing market conditions by comparing these structures in a simulation model.
Introduction
Over the two decades, governments have increasingly channeled public financing to new ventures through private sector
venture capital investors. This has reflected a popular policy belief that using professional investors as program agents is
more effective than the government itself attempting to act as a venture capitalist. These venture capital investment
funds are typically structured as ‘limited liability partnerships’, which are set up with a contract between the investors
(the limited partners or LP) and the managers of the fund (the general partners or GP). After the fund is established and
there is capital committed, the investors are legally constrained from a direct involvement in the operation of the fund in
order to keep preferential tax advantages. Thus, the ex ante structuring of the fund and detailed contractual
commitments are essential for the limited partners in order to control the conduct of general partners during the
lifetime of the fund.
When the public sector co-invests with private sector investors, the former’s political goals may conflict with the
interests of profit maximizing limited and general partners. Governments typically seek primarily welfare outcomes
through generation of employment, fostering of innovation, and the support of economic growth. Conversely, the
commercial participants in the fund seek the potential high returns of the asset class. The problems of conflicting public
and private interests are especially evident in cases where a government attempts to channel funding to a sector or
investment stage which does not generate attractive returns to private investors, and where a market failure may exist.
In order to encourage additional funding to areas that are unattractive to private sector investors, governments need to
devise mechanisms to support the market and to incentivize private sector interest. Several alternatives have been
deployed in numerous countries to facilitate the injection of public funding to these sectors. The results of these
mechanisms are as diverse as the underlying structures. However, the assessment of the effectiveness of each individual
structure is impeded by the heterogeneity of underlying political, economical and societal structures. Governments
facing the decision how to structure their intervention have to rely on evidence from the performance of tested structures
that is obscured by the idiosyncrasy of the national mechanisms. Coherent policy comparisons of cause and effect are
very difficult to make.
Earlier research on the subject reflects this complexity. Although there are multiple studies on the performance of
differing structures, these analyses mostly operate on country specific level (e.g. Lerner, 1999). Where international
comparisons are attempted, the conclusions are necessarily highly qualified (e.g. Maula & Murray, 2003). Mainstream
research on venture capital touches this subject in its focus on relationship between investors and managers of venture
capital funds. Yet, substantive research from the investors’ perspective itself is limited. Those few studies that address
the subject mostly cover issues such as the structures of relationship (Sahlman, 1990; Wright & Robbie, 1998), the
compensation and incentives of fund managers (Cooper & Carleton, 1979; Gompers & Lerner, 1999), and the structuring
of fund agreements (Brophy & Haessler, 1994). However, these studies sensibly assume that all limited partners invest
on equal terms.
This governance problem of conflicting investors’ interests is also addressed in the larger theoretical literature. An
underlying problem is how to structure the contract between the limited partner (the principal) and the venture
capitalist (the agent) in such a way that the fund yields a socially optimal outcome. Incentive and reward structures have
received extensive attention in the literatures of finance (e.g. Noe & Rebello, 1996), agency (e.g. Jensen & Meckling,
1976), and contracting. Specific to venture capital, the research has mostly concentrated on contracting between the
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur (e.g. Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1995;
Hellmann, 1998; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000; Sahlman, 1993; Trester, 1998) and between venture capitalists (Admati &
Pfleiderer, 1994; Cumming, 2001). While the contracts between limited and general partners share the same aspects of
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Pfleiderer, 1994; Cumming, 2001). While the contracts between limited and general partners share the same aspects of
agency, asymmetric information and contracting as the commitments between VCs and the ventures, there is only
limited research on the former subject. A notable exception is Gompers and Lerner (1996) who study the use of
covenants in venture partnership agreements.
Thus, the earlier research while valuable is problematic. On one hand, when assessing the performance of individual
programs, the idiosyncrasy of systems loses the distinctive characteristics of fund structures. On the other hand, when
considering the relationship between the limited and managing partners, it does not address a situation where one of the
investors would have other goals than maximizing return on investment.
This study aims to address this gap by providing an initial examination on the characteristics and performance of
various fund structures used in channeling public funding to support new, entrepreneurial firms. The research question
of this paper is: What are the effects of different incentive structures on the behavior and performance of publicly funded
venture capital programs? To answer this question, we first chart the range of incentive structures that are used in
publicly funded VC funds and review their implications for the fund performance. Second, we compare these structures
employing a simulation model to examine the differences in performance under changing market conditions.
This study seeks to make three contributions. Firstly, we survey the scope of fund structures used in public/private
co-financed venture capital programs. Secondly, we examine the nature of these structures under a neutral setting, thus
separating the effects of the structures from the effects of the surroundings and their interaction with the embedded
programs. This enables undistorted comparison between the structures. Thirdly, we provide insight for public decision
makers on how to structure future funds by examining the outcomes and risks of known structure types.
Government Venture Capital
The venture capital funds are predominantly structured as limited liability partnerships (LLPs), in which investors
become limited partners and venture capital fund managers are general partners (Sahlman, 1990). While the venture
capitalist firm acts as a vehicle to mitigate the inherent uncertainty, asymmetric information and agency costs of
investing directly in new ventures (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990;
Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Megginson & Weiss, 1991), the same conflicting interests are present between the general and
limited partners. In a typical LLP, the general partner effectively holds complete control over the committed funds and
the investment process of the partnership although it provides typically no more than 1% of the funds capital (Gilson,
2003; Sahlman, 1990). This structure is beset by various types of agency conflicts and the compensation structures are
specifically designed to resolve these issues. The primary compensation of the general partner consists of typically 20%
of the net capital gain (‘carried interest’) but only after returning the LP’s capital with a minimum level of interest
(‘hurdle rate’) (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). The carry incentive is designed to align directly LP and GP interests.
Because of the effectiveness of the US venture capital model in solving the problems associated with financing and
nurturing of high risk, new ventures, governments have increasingly channeled public financing to new ventures through
private sector venture capital investors. Venture capital is seen to have a positive impact on job creation, innovation, and
economic growth (Kortum & Lerner, 2000; NVCA, 2002), thus giving governments an incentive to support and grow
their domestic venture capital industries. The main role for governments is considered by practitioners to be in the
creation of favorable fiscal and legal environment for venture capital financing (EVCA, 2003). Direct involvement in new
venture investment by government agencies carries a material risk of market disruption through the misallocation of
capital and the crowding out of private investors due to inexperienced personnel and differing return requirements
(Leleux & Surlemont, 2003). However, supporters of the direct involvement of government as investor frequently
employ the arguments of market failure. A market failure occurs when market price mechanisms fails to produce socially
optimal outcome. In the case of venture capital, it has been argued that there exists a persistent market failure in the
financing of new ventures (Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2003). The risk-return characteristics are unfavorable for private
investors to engage in early stage ventures. However, as new ventures may create technological spillovers and social
outcomes in addition to financial outcome, it may be beneficial for a government to intervene in a venture capital
market. The situation is however specific to national markets, and while Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2003) conclude that
there exists a lack of financing in certain technological sectors of SMEs in Finland, Bank of England (2001) did not find
any substantial evidence for a market failure in the financing of technology-based small firms. The difficulties of
determining what a market failure is and what is more properly seen as ineffective demand (i.e. investors who are not
market ready) is an endemic problem with early-stage investing.
Although there is a lack of unambiguous evidence in the literature both on the existence of market failures and the effect
of venture capital on economic growth, the perceived benefits of direct involvement of governments in venture capital
markets have resulted in multiple national vehicles (See e.g. a review in Maula & Murray, 2003). This investment
activity is typically directed towards areas, where private markets are underdeveloped, e.g. early-stage investing in
technology ventures. In order to correct these failures in domestic VC markets, most countries have set up governmental
VC organizations to invest either directly in ventures or indirectly as a limited partner in third party established VC
funds. The indirect investments are done in co-operation with private sector investors. The structures of these vehicles
vary by country (Armour & Cumming, 2004; Gilson, 2003; Maula & Murray, 2003). While organizations such as the
European Investment Fund and the Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. have favored investing on equal terms with private
sector (pari passu), the original Israeli Yozma-fund was structured to provide a buy-out option for private sector
management participants thereby rewarding high investment performance. The German approach has included in
addition to investment incentives a ‘down side’ guarantee for losses provided by the state (Maula & Murray, 2003). In
their analysis of these various structures, both Gilson (2003) and Maula and Murray (2003) pointed out the importance
of the incentive structures in government sponsored venture capital programs. Both studies noted that compared to
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of the incentive structures in government sponsored venture capital programs. Both studies noted that compared to
guarantees on downside risk, structures which create incentives to exceed performance expectations (such as capped
return for the government investor or a buy-out option for private investors) are likely to be more effective. Murray and
Marriott (1998) also support this conclusion. However, due to the idiosyncratic contexts in which different models have
been tested, the strength of the case-based evidence on the effectiveness of various types of government venture capital
programs and resultant incentive structures is hampered. Therefore, we attempt to contribute to the understanding of
the performance effects of different types of incentive structures by building a simulation model of a venture capital fund
that can be used to compare various structures in a homogeneous context.
Simulation Model
Organization of Simulation
To explore the effects of profit distribution structures on the performance of the funds and on the outcomes to both the
LPs and GP, we model the operations and organization of a venture capital firm using a Monte Carlo simulation model
executed with Microsoft Excel. We build the simulation starting from the investment behavior of the fund manager (GP).
By making the venture capitalist’s behavior and investment decisions endogenous components of the simulation, we are
able to study the effects of the incentives on the outcomes of the fund.
The organization of the simulation is as follows. We assume an investment window of four years and fixed term fund of
ten year’s duration. Investments arrive at equally spaced intervals within the investment window after which each
investment goes through two additional investment rounds and an exit. Each step is assumed to take two years, thus
resulting in total six years for an investment in the portfolio. At each investment round, the GP assesses the investment
according to its previous development and expected outcomes, and makes a decision whether or not to continue the
investment. Should the venture reach the exit phase, the investment is liquidated and cash is distributed to the LPs of
the fund. Once the hurdle rate is met, the GP also participates in any further distributions on the agreed ratio of the
carry (20:80). After the all investments are concluded, either by a market exit or project abandonment, the cumulated
net capital gains are calculated for all parties.
Portfolio and Scenarios
We simulate the portfolio of the venture capitalist GP as consisting of 15 identical investments. The behavior and
development of the investments are modeled as a scenario tree, following the example and parameterization of Murray
and Marriott (1998). The development of a venture is simplified to three stages corresponding to the initial and two
follow-on investment rounds. At the end of each investment period, the venture has four development outcomes
expressed as a multiple for the change in the value of the venture over the preceding two years. In total, the scenario
structure results in 64 different outcomes (i.e. 4 x 4 x 4) after the third stage. The terminal value of the venture is
determined by the success of each investment round as it from stage to stage. This development is randomized using
probabilities for each of the four investment outcomes for each of the three stages.
Market Development
While the development of the venture is modeled using a scenario tree structure, the outcomes from an investment are
determined both by the development of the venture while in the portfolio and by the attractiveness of the exit market
once the venture capitalist seeks to liquidate its investment. To combine these both characteristics, we first calculate the
value of the investment for each of the outcome alternatives using the value multiples provided by Murray and Marriott
(1998). Second, as this multiple approach results in a range of potential values for the venture at the last stage, we
convert these values to an index using the highest outcome as a benchmark. In this case, if the venture achieves the most
desirable outcome at the end of each of the three sequential investment periods, the resulting relative value is one. The
other 63 outcomes receive values between zero and one.
This conversion offers us a means to relate the prevailing market situation to the value of an investment. We use the exit
value of the most successful venture as a market value indicator, and as we have benchmarked the other outcomes to the
highest value, we can simulate the market development with this indicator. Thus, the scenario tree depicts the internal
development of the venture, while the market situation captures the development of external factors. Should the
portfolio venture develop internally to its full potential without problems in the organization, growth, and execution of
the business plan, it is able to realize the highest market value possible at the time of the exit. However, as the exit
market fluctuates independently of individual ventures, the outcome values cannot be fully modeled using the scenario
tree exclusively.
Decision Making
When receiving a new investment proposal or considering an existing portfolio company with the need of an additional
round of finance, the decision of the GP to invest is determined by two factors. First, the GP assesses the investment
independently and without reference to the rest of the portfolio. Thus, if the focal investment is expected to reach an
acceptable risk adjusted return, the investment is made. When assessed as an individual investment, previously
committed capital and other resources (advice) are treated as sunk costs. However, the additional investment has also to
be assessed by its impact on the terminal performance of the enlarged fund. The second component of the venture
capitalist decision making is thus the expected return from the fund. Invariably, the cash flows to the GP are only
partially dependent on any individual venture. Thus, when a venture capitalist manages a fund that is significantly out of
the money (i.e. it is not expected to reach the hurdle rate i.e. the threshold level for the carried interest compensation), it
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the money (i.e. it is not expected to reach the hurdle rate i.e. the threshold level for the carried interest compensation), it
is financially rational for the VC to discard investments that would be financially sound as standalone ventures. Thus, for
a favorable investment decision, first the investment opportunity has to be attractive, and second, the rational incentives
for the GP to make the investment have to be in place.1
Incentive Structures
As the decision making of venture capitalist is based on expected cash flows, the profit distribution structure is of crucial
importance. The distribution structure consists of two distinctive parts. First, for the GP compensation we use the
standard structure consisting of a management fee of 2.5% of the fund size and 20% share of profits after a hurdle return
of 5%. It is assumed that the fee only covers operational costs and does not constitute a source of profit. Further, general
partners are required to provide an investment of 1% of the fund size (Gilson, 2003; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman,
1990). We hold this general partner specific compensation structure constant across the simulations. Second, the
variable part of the structure consists of the terms of investments of the LPs. We construct four alternative structures for
the profit distribution and study their effects on the incentives and fund’s net returns. First, as a benchmark, we use the
standard venture capital fund structure, where LPs invest on equal terms (pari passu) with no distinction between
private and public investors. Second, we study a model where public investor’s committed capital is drawn down before
calls on the private LPs. Third, we use a structure where the returns of public LP are limited to a predetermined level of
5%, and the remaining profits are distributed to the private LPs and the GP. Fourth, we implement a guarantee scheme,
where the governmental investor provides a guarantee for private investors, which covers 75% of the project investment
losses of private investors and GP.
Interrogating the Model
We compare the different profit distribution structures under two specific market scenarios. We first run the simulations
for each structure with a market level corresponding to an expected return of 18% for investors. This is a figure
comparable to long run VC returns in the US market. Then we use an alternative scenario where we introduce a
downward step of 25% in the markets valuations after four years into the life of 10-year fund, i.e., after closing of the
investment window. We execute 500 rounds of simulations for each of the four structure-market combinations to ensure
convergence.
Effect of Venture Capitalist’s Incentives on Fund Performance
To test the effect of venture capitalist incentives on the performance of the fund, we first compare the fund performance
under two types of VC behavior. First, the model follows both of the decision-making components, the net present value
of focal investment and the expected terminal value of the portfolio. After running the model under these pari passu
conditions, which we define as the base model, we further run the simulation ignoring the portfolio component of
decision making. This corresponds to a case where venture capitalist is ignorant to opportunity cost and invests always if
the net present value of focal investment is positive. Figure 1 presents the results for our analysis.
Under constant market conditions, both decision methods yield the same results. However, under the scenario where
the market falls 25%, the difference is clear. When the GP uses only a simple project NPV rule for decision-making, the
distribution of outcomes moves almost uniformly to left, corresponding to a fall of 7.42% in the median return (IRR) of
the portfolio. When introducing the portfolio effect to the investment decision, the fall in the median is 9.9%. In
addition, the distribution of return shows a strong left hand skew with negative returns and a second peak representing a
total loss of invested capital. This effect demonstrates the non-linear effect of GP’s incentives on the performance of the
fund.
In a fund, unlike a one-off investment choice, the existing portfolio investments are not sunk costs irrelevant to the
investment decision. Rather, as the GP’s returns are tied to the surplus delivered on the capital and imposed hurdle rate,
the situation may occur that the expected future profits from the fund are not large enough to reward the GP. If the fund
does not achieve at least the hurdle rate, the returns to the GP are limited to his 1% share as an LP of a poorly
performing fund. As GPs face an opportunity cost, the incentives may fail if actual and expected portfolio valuations are
too low. This is demonstrated in figure 1. Although the decreased market valuations would results in additional
investments being profitable as one-offs, the portfolio effect distorts the GP’s incentives.
Robustness of Venture Capitalist’s Incentives under Different Distribution Structures
As the portfolio, effect may lead to failure of GP’s incentives and lead to the dismissal of financially sound investments,
the robustness of venture capitalists incentives under unexpected market conditions become essential. While above we
illustrated the effect of the failure of the incentives to the returns, we next study the robustness of incentives under
different compensation structures.
We repeated the simulations for the different structures and tested their behavior under the two market scenarios
recording the number of occasions, where a financially sound investment was discarded due to failed incentives. While
all the structures performed flawlessly under normal market conditions, there were differences in the robustness of
incentives when tested under conditions of an adverse market change. Figure 2 present the results from these
simulations.
The pari passu structure coincides with the structure used in the examination of the effect of failure on the performance.
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The pari passu structure coincides with the structure used in the examination of the effect of failure on the performance.
We use it here as a benchmark for the other structures, as it represents the standard structure of venture capital funds.
When we change the structure to the one in which the public LP leverages the returns to the private LPs by investing in
the fund first, the failure rate of incentives increases. This effect is due to the staging of capital investments between
public and private investors. The GP provides 1% of the capital to the fund. When public investor invests first, the
drawdowns from the venture capitalist are delayed. Once the private LPs investments are required after the public
investor has made its contribution, their net present value introduces a higher hurdle than in the pari passu case. Thus,
the public investor effectively offers the GP an option to first invest with public money and then observe the
development of fund before the decision to invest its own money. This timing, however, also introduces a hurdle that
leads to weakened incentives.
When we use the structure, in which the profits for the public investor are limited to 5%, the failure rate is reduced. The
limited distribution of profits to the public investor increases the distribution to the private LPs and the GP, thereby
strengthening the incentives. The failure rate produced by the guarantee structure is identical to the pari passu structure.
In this model, the public investor guarantees 75% of the losses. However, this guarantee does not have an effect on GP
decision making as the venture capitalist incentives have failed much earlier in the investment cycle.
While the pari passu model and the guarantee model produce identical failure rates for the GP’s incentives, differences
emerge when we examine the frequency of those occasions in which public investors lose their capital. (An IRR of -99%
indicates the near total loss of all monies invested.). In the guarantee model, the public investor’s losses are increased
due to the payments to the private LPs, while in pari passu model the losses are equally divided. The effects of the other
models of capped public investor profits and of sequential entries of public and private investors are similar. The
proportion of funds where public capital is lost is increased with respect to the benchmark when we use the model where
the public investor invests first. It should be noted, that this proportion is lower for the sequential investments model
than it is for the guarantee model. Although failures in incentives occur more often with sequential model the with the
guarantee model, the amplified losses due to the 75% guarantee increase the number of occasions where capital is lost.
It is interesting to note that also the proportion of failed funds is lower for the model where the profits of the public
investor are capped. Since the downside is shared equally with the private LP, it seems that the capped profits model is
more likely to avoid large losses to government than the other models. On one hand, the profits for the public investor
are naturally lower due to the profit cap. However, on the other hand, there is a commensurately lower risk of large
losses. Compared to other models the capped return model has a higher probability than other models to produce
positive (but capped) returns for the government investor.
These results indicate that although the profit distribution and investment structures are mainly directed to alter the
profit distribution between the public and private LPs, they also affect the incentives and actions of GPs. Furthermore,
the failure rates are connected to the returns of the public investor through the structures used to share the profits and
losses. While the failure rates demonstrate differences among the structures, we emphasize that the context-dependence
of the frequencies. Although the direction and relative size of changes in the models can be meaningfully interpreted, the
actual frequencies reported are contingent upon the model and its parameters.
Conclusions
In this paper, we set out to analyze the impact of different incentive structures in publicly co-financed venture capital
funds on the incentives of general partners and the subsequent performance of the venture capital funds. Prior research
focusing on the same problem has relied on case analysis (Gilson, 2003) providing deep insight but making it difficult to
differentiate the effects of the incentive structures from the idiosyncratic characteristics of the context in the case
countries. In order to allow direct comparison and analysis of the effects of the structures, we resort to modeling and
simulation. This allows us to compare directly the behavior of alternative structures under different market scenarios.
In our Monte Carlo simulation, we find that market conditions clearly influence the investment behavior of venture
capitalists if they consider the performance impact of each investment on the returns from the total portfolio. As the
general partner’s compensation is based on the share of capital gain left over after invested capital is paid back with
interest (the hurdle), the investment decisions of the GP are affected by the situation of the portfolio as a whole.
Investments made earlier in other ventures cannot be treated separately or as sunk costs. This may lead to termination
of financially sound additional investments. Optimizing the performance of the portfolio leads to suboptimal outcomes
for individual ventures (Gifford, 1997). In our simulation, we find that in a scenario where market has declined rapidly
investors considering the impact of investments on the total portfolio may end up giving up investment opportunities
that would be attractive when appraised as one-off investments.
Supporting prior case based research, our Monte Carlo simulation also shows that different incentive structures created
in the contracts between the public investor, institutional investors and the management firm, do influence the
investment behavior of the fund managers (Gilson, 2003). In our study, we find that asymmetric profit sharing between
the government investor and the private LPs can lead to improved robustness in conditions of adverse market
developments if the incentives are properly structured. In our analysis, we find that the alternative structures in which
the returns to government investors are capped to the hurdle rate and returns in excess of this rate are shared between
the LPs and the GP yields an incentive structure that is less likely to fail under unexpected adverse market
developments. Capped public returns compared favorably to pari passu profit sharing or structures in which government
invests before LPs or in which part of the LPs’/GP’s losses are guaranteed by the state.
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Furthermore, our analyses show that the outcomes from the failure of incentives vary between the alternative structures.
In the guarantee structure, where the public investor provides a downside protection for the private investors, the costs
are notably increased in the cases where incentives fail. These results are clearly in line with the prior research
examining the incentive structures built in government venture capital programs (Gilson, 2003). However, for the first
time, using simulation, we are able to disconnect the programs from the underlying idiosyncratic elements and to
provide evidence supporting these arguments. Based on our results we can say that the incentive structures implicitly or
explicitly built into government venture capital programs influence economically rational investors. The influences may
engender outcomes which would be seen as perverse by the public architects of the fund given their socially sub-optimal
consequences.
While our results indicate difference among the structures with respect to their ability to create incentives for the GP and
to distribute profits and losses among LPs, we emphasis three restrictions on the interpretation of our results. First, the
investment behavior of the venture capitalist is modeled with a decision making model based on the opportunity costs of
venture capitalist general partner. This model assumes that the GP has feasible and attractive alternatives. However, the
legal agreements between general and limited partners as well as the implications on reputation effects usually tie the
general partner to the fund. This severely constrains the freedom of venture capitalist to turn to alternative opportunities
should the outlook of fund turn unfavorable. Thus, the consequences of the failure of the incentives are not likely to be as
total as in the model. However, while a total abandonment of the fund is unlikely, the missing incentives are likely to
affect the effort contributed by the management and the consequent outcomes on the fund’s performance. Thus, we
claim that the results illustrate an existing tendency resulting from the incentive structures of venture capitalist. The
relative importance of short run monetary incentives against the contractual and reputational bounds is an interesting
question for the further research.
The second assumption in the model that could be relaxed in future research is that GPs cannot change the risk profile
of their investments so that in the case of ‘out of the money’ portfolio they could start to make speculative high risk
investments which, if successful, could produce high returns and help the fund to exceed the hurdle rate. The third
limitation and source for further research stems from the use of frequencies to describe the differences between the
structures. Although our analysis of relative frequencies and changes highlights source of differences in the structures, a
valuable contribution from the future research would be the quantification of the net capital gains under each structure.
Future research could e.g. aim to quantify the net effect of higher probability of positive returns but capped maximum
returns in the capped return structure compared to the standard pari passu model. The paper has important
implications for the several governments considering various models of public support for venture capitalist activities in
early-stage investments. The incentives that are created as a result of the program structure influence the outcomes and
the performance of the program sometimes in unexpected ways. Understanding the effects of different structures is
crucial for governments that wish to create successful government venture capital programs that extend beyond one
fund raising.
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